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In retirement saving, many people miss out on early opportunities to save and subse-
quently fail to take adequate actions for a long time thereafter. We examined
whether these two observations—the initial failure to act and the subsequent iner-
tia—could be related through the phenomenon of inaction inertia. In Experiment 1
(N = 180), participants were less likely to save for retirement when the difference
in annual return between the current opportunity and the missed opportunity was
large versus small. In Experiment 2 (N = 180), participants were less likely to start sav-
ing for retirement when reminded of a missed opportunity 10 years ago versus 1 year
ago. These data constitute the first demonstration of inaction inertia in retirement
saving: People's reluctance to act on attractive saving opportunities may be induced
by their previous inaction. In Experiment 3 (N = 340) and Experiment 4 (N = 628),
we find that the observed inertia is the product of a tendency to underestimate expo-
nential growth combined with a focus on past opportunities. Building on this mecha-
nism, Experiment 5 (N = 916) provided evidence for a potential remedy; the inaction
inertia effect completely disappeared when focus was shifted from required contribu-
tions to future outcomes.
KEYWORDS
exponential growth bias, inaction inertia, inertia, missed opportunities, retirement saving1 | INTRODUCTION
Many people are not taking full advantage of attractive opportunities
to save for retirement. In the United States, a great number of eligible
employees are not enrolled in tax‐advantaged retirement plans (e.g.,
401(k) or individual retirement account) or contribute only a small pro-
portion of their income (Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2011; Helman,
Copeland, & VanDerhei, 2015; Munnell & Sundén, 2006; Rhee,
2013). Such inertia in retirement saving is not unique to the United
States. In countries with voluntary retirement saving schemes, enroll-
ment rates are generally lower than expected (van Els, van Rooij, &
Schuit, 2007). Inertia can even impact savings when enrollment is
mandatory. For instance, in the 16 years following the introduction
of a new mandatory pension scheme in Sweden in 1999, 72.6% of
enrollees who had originally invested in the default fund had not made
a single change to their portfolio (Cronqvist, Thaler, & Yu, 2018). What
can explain this widespread and pervasive inertia in retirement saving?wileyonlinelibrary.com/joWhy are so many people forgoing financially attractive opportunities
to save more for retirement?
One explanation is that people do not fully appreciate the attrac-
tiveness of starting to save for retirement as early in life as possible.
Keeping everything else constant, retirement saving decisions are a
series of constantly worsening opportunities. Starting to save for
retirement at age 26 results in substantially less retirement wealth
than starting to save at age 25. Put differently, accumulating retire-
ment wealth is cheapest if one starts saving as early as possible
(Munnell, Golub‐Sass, & Webb, 2011). Research confirms that many
people underestimate the benefits of early saving (Eisenstein & Hoch,
2007; McKenzie & Liersch, 2011; Stango & Zinman, 2009). For
instance, when college students were asked to calculate how much
one should increase monthly saving to make up for a 20‐year delay,
given a fixed return of 5% or 10%, the modal responses ($200/month
for both returns) were a vast underestimation of the correct answers
($365/month and $773/month for 5% and 10%, respectively;J Behav Dec Making. 2020;33:52–62.urnal/bdm
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exponential growth of savings and the benefits of starting to save
early.
Financial institutions, governments, employers, and individual
financial advisors often attempt to educate the public about the
importance of early retirement saving, working from the assumption
that this will motivate people to act sooner. For example, the website
of Fidelity Investments—the largest service provider of 401(k) retire-
ment services in the United States—recommends consumers that
“the single most important thing you can do is start saving early”
because “the earlier you start to save, the lower your yearly savings
rate needs to be” (Fidelity Investments, 2018). Another example is
Investopedia.com (2016), a for‐profit website providing investment
advice to the general public. Investopedia.com has an entire page
devoted to explaining “why your 20s are the perfect time to start sav-
ing for those post‐work years.” Such attempts to inform consumers
about the importance of early saving can be effective. However, there
is also a potential pitfall. Informing people about the benefits of early
saving may remind them of attractive opportunities they have already
missed. This reminder of a missed opportunity may inadvertently
make people less instead of more inclined to start saving—a phenom-
enon called inaction inertia (Tykocinski, Pittman, & Tuttle, 1995).1.1 | Inaction inertia
Consider a 35‐year old woman who is given the opportunity to enroll
in an attractive, employer‐sponsored 401(k) plan. On a website for
financial advice, such as Investopedia.com, she reads that it is best
to start saving for retirement while in your 20s. This reminds her of
the fact that she seriously considered enrolling in the same 401(k) plan
some 10 years ago. How would this well‐intended reminder affect her
likelihood to enroll in the plan now that she is 35?
From a rational perspective, a history of missed opportunities
should be irrelevant to people's evaluations of current opportunities
and to the likelihood to act on these opportunities, because only
future costs and benefits should matter for the decision. From a moti-
vational perspective, one could reason that people for whom retire-
ment saving is most pressing should be most inclined to enroll.
Following this reasoning, it seems plausible that information about
the attractiveness of missed opportunities may motivate people to
act on subsequent opportunities.
Surprisingly, research suggests that people may not always adhere
to either normative or motivational logic when it comes to dealing
with missed opportunities (e.g., Tykocinski et al., 1995; Tykocinski &
Pittman, 1998). An initial failure to act on an attractive opportunity
can sometimes induce more inertia—a tendency called inaction inertia.
Here is an example: Last week you forgot to buy your preferred brand
of laundry detergent when it was on a steep discount. This week you
return to the grocery store and see that the laundry detergent is still
attractively priced, but not as cheap as last week. Normally, you would
have been more than willing to buy the product for its current price.
However, what research on inaction inertia suggests is that you wouldbe less likely to do so under these circumstances, where you missed a
much better opportunity the week before.
Inaction inertia has been observed for a wide variety of decisions
such as buying groceries, signing up for a fitness center, enrolling in
a university course, buying a ski pass, and betting on horse racing
(Arkes, Kung, & Hutzel, 2002; Tykocinski et al., 1995; Tykocinski &
Pittman, 1998; Zeelenberg, Nijstad, van Putten, & van Dijk, 2006). It
has been linked to temporary dips in product sales after a promotion
(Zeelenberg & van Putten, 2005), to failures and deadlocks in interna-
tional negotiations (Terris & Tykocinski, 2016), to lower motivation to
work on a crowdsource platform after missing a bonus (Mathmann,
Higgins, Chylinski, & De Ruyter, 2017), and to investors' reluctance
to leave bear markets (Tykocinski, Israel, & Pittman, 2004). In all these
studies, people were less likely to act on an attractive opportunity
when they had missed a much more attractive opportunity in the past
(for reviews, seeTykocinski & Ortmann, 2011; van Putten, Zeelenberg,
van Dijk, & Tykocinski, 2014; van Putten, Zeelenberg, & van Dijk,
2013).
The domain of retirement saving shares two characteristics with
the instances where inaction inertia has been observed in the past.
First, people often miss attractive opportunities to start saving when
they are young and retirement is still decades away. Second, the
attractiveness of saving opportunities can change rather abruptly.
The prospected return of enrollment in a retirement plan fluctuates
over time, just like the price of a laundry detergent in the local grocery
store can fluctuate over time. Take, for example, the annualized S&P
500 return (dividends reinvested and inflation adjusted) as a proxy
for the return on a retirement investment. Between January 1995
and January 2005, return would have been 8.96%. If one had waited
10 years and invested between January 2005 and January 2015,
return would have been −3% (see https://dqydj.com/sp‐500‐return‐
calculator). Fluctuations in the attractiveness of retirement saving
opportunities may also result from a change in employment status
(e.g., losing a job that offered an employer‐sponsored retirement plan)
or a change in public policy (e.g., the abolition of a tax exemption on
retirement contributions).
This combination of factors—a tendency to be inactive plus
abruptly changing investment opportunities—prompted us to think
that inaction inertia may occur in retirement decisions. Missing an
opportunity to enroll in a retirement plan when prospected returns
are high may decrease the likelihood of enrollment once the
prospected returns are lower.1.2 | Timing of opportunities
To date, most research on inaction inertia has examined situations
where an abrupt change to an opportunity—a discount that ends, a
stock price that falls—was necessary for inaction inertia to occur. We
believe that in the context of retirement saving inaction inertia may
occur even when there is no abrupt change in the prospected return.
In retirement decisions, the passing of time after the missed opportu-
nity can induce inaction inertia. At first sight, this prediction may seem
KRIJNEN ET AL.54at odds with previous research that has found that time may weaken
inaction inertia.
Consider a study by Tykocinski and Pittman (2001), which asked
participants to imagine they had missed a large discount on a charter
tour to Italy. One group of participants read that the attractive dis-
count had ended yesterday. Another group read that the discount
had ended 5 days earlier. Inaction inertia was observed among partic-
ipants who read that only 1 day had passed since the initial opportu-
nity, but the effect was absent among those who read that 5 days
had passed since the initial opportunity. Later research suggested that
this is an illustration of a more general pattern: People's likelihood to
act on a current opportunity is affected less by the attractiveness of
a missed opportunity to the extent that it is easier to mentally decou-
ple the opportunities from each other (van Putten, Zeelenberg, & van
Dijk, 2007). Time is one factor that can decouple two similar opportu-
nities. As more time passes after having missed an opportunity, that
initial opportunity becomes less relevant as a benchmark to evaluate
the attractiveness of subsequent opportunities. As a result, the inac-
tion inertia effect becomes attenuated or is completely absent when
there is a longer time between the two opportunities.
If the passing of time decouples the current opportunity from the
missed opportunity and attenuates inaction inertia, then why would
we expect that the passing of time can induce inaction inertia in retire-
ment decisions? To answer this question, we need to understand what
sets retirement saving apart from most other domains where inaction
inertia has been studied.
Holding everything else constant, opportunities to save for retire-
ment constantly worsen over time. When comparing a current oppor-
tunity to save with an opportunity that was missed 10 years ago, the
missed opportunity seems much more attractive than the opportunity
to start saving today. The difference in attractiveness between the
missed opportunity and the current opportunity increases only further
as more time passes after having missed the initial opportunity. In fact,
the forgone gains of a missed retirement saving opportunity—that is,
how much a person could have saved by now if she or he had enrolled
earlier—increase exponentially over time because of compounding
returns. As mentioned before, most people systematically underesti-
mate the exponential growth of an investment over time (see Eisen-
stein & Hoch, 2007; McKenzie & Liersch, 2011; Stango & Zinman,
2009). Hence, in a context of exponential growth, a missed opportu-
nity will seem increasingly attractive as time passes, leading to the
hypothesis that the passing of time will induce inaction inertia in
retirement decisions.
The predicted inaction inertia effect is the product of a tendency
to ruminate on missed opportunities combined with a tendency to
underestimate exponential growth. Therefore, not all attempts to pro-
vide information about the exponential rate with which opportunities
change over time will have the same effect. Consider an alternative
case in which people are made aware of exponential growth through
information about the rapid deterioration of future opportunities to
save, instead of through information about past opportunities to save.
Here, we expect that the current opportunity will seem financially
attractive relative to the future opportunity. As a consequence, wepredict the following pattern: Reminders of how saving opportunities
will worsen from the present to the future will induce less inertia than
will reminders of how saving opportunities have worsened from the
past to the present.1.3 | Shifting focus as a remedy for inaction inertia
If inaction inertia can indeed occur in retirement decisions as we pro-
pose, induced either by an abrupt change in expected returns or by
the exponential worsening of saving opportunities over time, then this
has important implications for how financial advisors and financial
institutions should communicate to consumers. Explaining the relative
attractiveness of early enrollment into a retirement plan may increase
the likelihood of inertia for people who missed their chance to enroll
early. Fortunately, we have reasons to suspect that an effective rem-
edy to this problem is available—an intervention that would attenuate
inaction inertia by focusing people's attention on future outcomes (i.e.,
how much money one would end up with at retirement age) instead of
on contributions (i.e., how much money one would have to save every
month).
Highlighting the potential growth of retirement savings increases
motivation to start saving as early as possible (McKenzie & Liersch,
2011). We expect this positive effect to outweigh any negative effect
caused by information about the relative attractiveness of a missed
opportunity. When retirement saving opportunities are described in
terms of required contributions, people will focus on the relative unat-
tractiveness of the current opportunity, and we expect inaction inertia
will occur. When opportunities are instead communicated in terms of
expected outcomes, people will focus on the fact that both the missed
opportunity and the current opportunity are undeniably attractive, and
we expect inaction inertia will be attenuated or even absent.
A moderating effect of outcome (vs. contribution) focus on inac-
tion inertia would fit well with previous findings indicating that a focus
on opportunities for improvement in the present or in the future is
associated with weaker inaction inertia, whereas a focus on the loss
of missing past opportunities is associated with stronger inaction iner-
tia. For instance, research found that inaction inertia did not occur
when the current opportunity was framed as a gain instead of as a loss
(Tykocinski et al., 1995) and when the attractiveness of the current
opportunity was emphasized (see van Putten et al., 2013). Further-
more, people were found to experience more regret and feel more
responsible for opportunities to be missed in the future than for
equally attractive opportunities missed in the past (Shani, Danziger,
& Zeelenberg, 2015). Inaction inertia was also found to be weaker
when people were asked to think about multiple options being avail-
able in the present but stronger when they were asked to think about
multiple options they missed in the past (van Putten, Zeelenberg, &
van Dijk, 2008). Another study found that inaction inertia did not
occur among people who were instructed to imagine that they had
not much longer to live, a mental exercise that focuses people on
the future and may lead to less rumination about the past (Strough,
Parker, & Bruine de Bruin, 2019). Finally, inaction inertia was found
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opportunities for improvement (i.e., an action‐oriented mindset) com-
pared with those who tend to dwell on the past (i.e., a state‐oriented
mindset; van Putten, Zeelenberg, & van Dijk, 2009). Taken together, a
focus on potential gains in the future seems to be associated with
weaker inaction inertia than does a focus on the losses of missed
opportunities from the past. This supports our prediction that shifting
the focus from contributions to outcomes may be an effective remedy
to inaction inertia in retirement saving.1.4 | Overview of studies
The remainder of this article discusses five experiments testing the
hypotheses outlined above. First, we present two experiments exam-
ining the occurrence of inaction inertia in retirement saving as induced
by a change in prospected annual return (Experiment 1) and by the
exponential worsening of opportunities over time (Experiment 2).
Then, we present one preregistered experiment testing the mediating
role of estimated cost of inertia (Experiment 3), one preregistered
experiment testing the moderating role of reminding people of a
future opportunity versus past opportunity (Experiment 4), and one
preregistered experiment testing the moderating role of describing
saving opportunities in terms of outcomes versus contributions
(Experiment 5). These studies provide insight into the situational fac-
tors that can induce inaction inertia, into the generalizability of the
effect across domains and situations, and into the mechanisms driving
the effect. From a practical perspective, these studies may also be use-
ful in the search for interventions that aim to reduce retirement saving
inertia. We will return to these contributions in section 7.
For all experiments, we recruited participants through Amazon's
online crowdsourcing marketplace Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”). The
use of MTurk and related services has quickly become common prac-
tice in behavioral research. It has been repeatedly found that MTurk
participants are equally reliable and attentive as classical lab partici-
pants (i.e., students) while providing greater diversity in terms of the
population they represent (e.g., Hauser & Schwarz, 2016; Huff & Ting-
ley, 2015; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis,
2010), which is clearly an advantage when studying retirement saving.
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if
any), all manipulations, and all measures in the experiments.1We aimed to recruit 180 participants, based on a power analysis for a t test (effect size
d = 0.5, power 1 − β = .9, required N = 172).
2Including age as a covariate in an analysis of variance does not change the pattern of results.
Age has no significant effect on the likelihood of enrollment (p = .91), and the effect of con-
dition remains significant (p < .001).2 | EXPERIMENT 1
This first experiment tested whether inaction inertia can occur in
retirement saving, as induced by a change in the prospected return
on a retirement plan between opportunities to enroll. The experimen-
tal procedure was similar to the procedure that is standard in research
on inaction inertia. Participants read about two opportunities to enroll
in a retirement plan, both described in terms of expected annual
return: one opportunity they missed and one current opportunity on
which they can choose to act. Whereas the description of the current
opportunity was the same for all participants, the description of themissed opportunity was varied between the two conditions. For one
group, the difference in annual return between the missed opportunity
and the current opportunity was small. For the other group, the differ-
ence in annual return between the missed opportunity and the current
opportunity was large.
We hypothesized that people are less likely to enroll in the retire-
ment plan under current conditions when the difference is large than
when the difference is small. If confirmed, this would provide evidence
that inaction inertia can be induced by a change in the annual return
between a missed opportunity and a current opportunity to enroll in
a retirement plan.2.1 | Method
One hundred and eighty participants (42.8% female, Mage = 31.46,
SDage = 9.34) were randomly assigned to a large difference condition
or a small difference condition.1 Participants in the large difference
[small difference] condition were asked to imagine the following
scenario:You work for Company A. When you started working for
this company five years ago, you were offered the
opportunity to enroll in their retirement plan. The plan
offered a fixed annual return of 9% [4%] for the next
15 years. You thought that this was an attractive
opportunity, but by the time you responded, the offer
had expired.To make sure participants had read the scenario carefully, we asked:
“If you would have enrolled in the retirement plan five years ago, what
would have been your fixed annual return?” In both conditions, the
possible answers were 4% and 9%. Participants could proceed to the
next page only after correctly answering this question. In case of an
incorrect answer, they were prompted with the question again until
the answer was correct.
On the next page, participants read: “Now, five years later, you
receive another letter about the retirement plan. If you enroll now,
your fixed annual return would be lower: 3% for the next 15 years.”
As a dependent variable, we asked: “How likely is it that you would
enroll in the retirement plan with the 3% fixed annual return?” Partic-
ipants answered on a rating scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 7
(very likely).2.2 | Results and discussion
The results showed inaction inertia in retirement saving decisions. Par-
ticipants in the large difference condition were less likely to enroll in
the retirement plan (M = 3.59, SD = 1.54) than were participants in
KRIJNEN ET AL.56the small difference condition (M = 4.61, SD = 1.58), t(178) = 4.39,
p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.65, 95% CI for Cohen's d [0.35, 0.95].2
This experiment demonstrates that inaction inertia can occur in a
retirement saving context as result of a change in annual return. Peo-
ple indicated that they were less likely to enroll in a retirement plan
after missing an opportunity that was much better than after missing
an opportunity that was only slightly better. In the next experiment,
we tested whether inaction inertia can also be induced in a different
way—one that has not been considered by previous research.3 | EXPERIMENT 2
We hypothesized that, in the context of retirement saving, the passing
of time can induce inaction inertia because it is associated with expo-
nential worsening of opportunities. Saving up enough money to live
comfortably during retirement is relatively cheap if one starts early on
in life but becomes more expensive the longer one waits. The difference
in attractiveness between a focal opportunity and a missed opportunity
increases as the time passed between the two increases. Experiment 2
tested whether participants would be less likely to enroll in an attractive
retirement plan when reminded of a distant past (and thus much more
attractive) opportunity, compared with when reminded of a recent past
(and thus slightly more attractive) opportunity.
3.1 | Method
One hundred and eighty participants (28.9% female, Mage = 31.56,
SDage = 10.57) were randomly assigned to a 10‐year condition or a
1‐year condition.3 Participants in the 10‐year [1‐year] condition were
asked to imagine the following scenario4:3We aim
d = 0.5, p
4Require
and ageTen years [One year] ago, when you started working for
Company A, you were offered the possibility to enroll in
the company's retirement plan. In a letter about the
plan, it said: “If you put in $250 [$450] each month,
you will be able to live comfortably during retirement.”To make sure participants had read the scenario carefully, we asked
“Ten years [One year] ago, how much money did you have to put in
each month to live comfortably during retirement?” In both conditions,
the possible answers were $450 and $250. Participants could proceed
to the next page only after correctly answering this question. In case
of an incorrect answer, they were prompted with the question again
until the answer was correct.
On the next page, participants read:The past 10 years [The past year] you repeatedly
considered enrolling but you never got around to doing
it. This week, you receive another letter about theed to recruit 180 participants, based on a power analysis for a t test (effect size
ower 1 − β = .9, required N = 172).
d contributions are approximations of a scenario with 6.5% annual return (reinvested)
35 at time of the focal opportunity.
5Includin
Age has
dition repossibility to enroll in the retirement plan. The letter
says: “If you had enrolled 10 years ago [1 year ago],
you would have put in $250 [$450] per month. To
accumulate the same wealth, you would now have to
put in $500 each month.”As dependent variable, we asked: “Given that you would now have to
put in $500 each month, how likely is it that you would enroll in the
retirement plan this year?” Participants answered on a rating scale
ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely).3.2 | Results and discussion
The results showed evidence for inaction inertia in retirement deci-
sions induced by exponential worsening of opportunities over time.
Participants in the 10‐year condition were less likely to enroll in the
retirement plan (M = 3.94, SD = 1.69) than were participants in the
1‐year condition (M = 4.92, SD = 1.38), t(178) = 4.26, p < .001, Cohen's
d = 0.64, 95% CI for Cohen's d [0.33, 0.94].5
People indicated that they were less likely to enroll in a retirement
plan when reminded of missing an opportunity 10 years ago, when
required contributions were much lower, compared with when they
were reminded of missing an opportunity 1 year ago, when required
contributions were only slightly lower. Taken together, Experiments
1 and 2 demonstrate two ways in which inaction inertia can be
induced in retirement saving—by a change in expected return and by
the exponential worsening of opportunities over time. The prediction
that the worsening of opportunities could induce inaction inertia was
based on the assumption that people underestimate the exponential
rate of change in opportunities. The next experiment directly tested
this mechanism.4 | EXPERIMENT 3
This experiment examined whether people's intuitions about the
financial consequence of missing an opportunity mediates the inaction
inertia effect. We predicted that participants who read about missing
an opportunity to enroll in a retirement plan 10 years ago (at age 25)
would estimate the required contribution at age 35 as lower compared
with participants who read about missing an opportunity 1 year ago
(at age 34), and that this difference in estimated contributions would
drive the difference in likelihood to enroll at age 35. Before data col-
lection, we preregistered the hypotheses, materials, inclusion criteria,
and key analyses (see osf.io/6rnwg).4.1 | Method
Of the 407 participants who completed the survey, 340 participants
answered the attention check correctly and passed the other inclusiong age as a covariate in an analysis of variance does not change the pattern of results.
no significant effect on the likelihood of enrollment (p = .70), and the effect of con-
mains significant (p < .001).
KRIJNEN ET AL. 57criteria (47.9% female, Mage = 39.16, SDage = 12.64).
6 Only these par-
ticipants (i.e., 83.5%) were included in the analyses.
The procedure in Experiment 3 was similar to that in Experiment 2.
Participants were randomly assigned to a 10‐year condition or a 1‐
year condition. Those in the 10‐year [1‐year] condition were asked
to imagine the following scenario7:6We aime




focal oppoSuppose you are 25 years [34 years] old right now. You
recently started working at a new job. The company
offers the possibility to enroll in the company's
retirement plan. In a letter about the plan, it says: “If
you contribute $250 [$450] every month, you will be
able to live comfortably during retirement. This
contribution of $250 [$450] per month is based on the
assumptions thatThis sentence should start on a new
line, just like the next sentence.
…… the account earns 6.5% interest every year,
compounded annually.
… you retire 40 years [31 years] from now, at age 65.
Please answer the following two questions, using the
information that we provided.”To make sure participants read the scenario carefully, we asked
the following open‐ended question: “According to the letter, how
much money would you have to contribute every month to live
comfortably during retirement?” Participants who did not provide
the correct answer ($250 in the 10‐year condition; $450 in the 1‐
year condition) could continue to complete the survey but were a
priori excluded from analyses. Participants were asked the following
open‐ended question: “Suppose that you do not enroll at age 25
[age 34], but wait 10 years [1 year] and enroll at age 35. How much
money would you have to contribute every month to accumulate
the same retirement wealth? Please provide your thoughtful best
guess.” As preregistered, data from participants who provided an
estimate lower than $250 [$450] or higher than $1,000 (twice the
correct answer of $500) were excluded. We reasoned that these
participants either did not read the instructions carefully or did not
provide a thoughtful best guess.
On the next page, participants read:Now suppose that it is 10 years [1 year] later. You are
35 years old. The past 10 years [the past year] you
repeatedly considered enrolling into the company's
retirement plan, but you never got around to doing it.
This week, you receive another letter about the
possibility to enroll in the retirement plan. The letter
says: “If you had enrolled 10 years ago [1 year ago],
you would have had to contribute $250 [$450] perd to recruit 400 participants, based on a power analysis for a t test (effect size
wer 1 − β = .95, required N = 210) and assuming that we would have to exclude
ts who failed to pass the preregistered exclusion criteria.
ired contributions described in this scenario are approximations of the contributions




dition remmonth. To accumulate the same wealth, you would now
have to contribute $500 every month.”As a dependent variable, we asked: “Given the situation, how likely is
it that you would enroll in the retirement plan this year?” Participants
answered on a rating scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very
likely).4.2 | Results and discussion
First, the results showed inaction inertia in retirement decisions
induced by the passing of time. Participants in the 10‐year condition
were less likely to enroll in the retirement plan (M = 4.35, SD = 1.77)
than do participants in the 1‐year condition (M = 4.89, SD = 1.64),
t(338) = 2.93, p = .004, Cohen's d = 0.32, 95% CI for Cohen's d
[0.10, 0.53].8 Second, participants in the 10‐year condition estimated
the required contribution at age 35 to be lower (M = $427.27,
Mdn = $400.00, SD = $142.12) than did participants in the 1‐year
condition (M = $510.07, Mdn = $477.50, SD = $90.30),
t(286) = 6.41, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.70, 95% CI for Cohen's d
[0.48, 0.92].
In a linear regression with condition and estimated contribution as
predictors and likelihood to enroll as a dependent variable, the effect
of condition was not significant, β = −.08, t(337) = −1.50, p = .136,
whereas the negative effect of estimated contribution was significant,
β = .224, t(337) = 4.03, p < .001. We used the mediation package in R
by Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, and Imai (2014) to obtain the
indirect effect and 95% CI from 1,000 bootstrap samples. This analysis
showed a significant indirect effect of condition on likelihood to enroll
via estimated contribution, ab = −.26, 95% CI [−0.37, −0.16], p = .012.
To further explore this mediation, we examined the likelihood of
underestimating the required contribution at age 35 ($500 in both con-
ditions). More participants in the 10‐year condition underestimated
(73.5%) than do those in the 1‐year condition (58.8%), χ2(1) = 7.57,
p < .001. Participants who underestimated the required contribution
at age 35 indicated that they were less likely to enroll (M = 4.49,
SD = 1.75) than did participants who did not underestimate the required
contribution (M = 4.88, SD = 1.65), t(242) = 1.99, p = .047, Cohen's
d = 0.22, 95% CI for Cohen's d [0.00, 0.45].
To summarize, Experiment 3 replicated the inaction inertia
induced by the exponential worsening of opportunities over time
from Experiment 2. Moreover, this experiment showed that inaction
inertia in retirement saving is associated with a misunderstanding of
how opportunities to start saving worsen over time. Combining our
findings so far, we posit that retirement saving inertia can be the
result of an attempt to provide insight into the exponential
worsening of saving opportunities, but only when people are
reminded of past opportunities and not when people are reminded
of future opportunities. The next experiment directly tested this
prediction.age as a covariate in an analysis of variance does not change the pattern of results.
o significant effect on the likelihood of enrollment (p = .39), and the effect of con-
ains significant (p = .004).
TABLE 1 Experiment 4: Mean likelihood to enroll (on a scale from
1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely)
Opportunity condition
1 year 10 years p10‐year [1‐year] condition
Past opportunity 4.60 (1.76) 3.44 (1.85) <.001
“If you had enrolled 10 years
ago [1 year ago], you would
have had to contribute $250
[$450] per month. If you enroll
this month, you would have to
contribute $500 per month.”
Future opportunity 4.75 (1.97) 4.78 (1.83) .90
“If you enroll this month, you
would have to contribute $500
per month. If you would wait
10 years [1 year] before you
enroll, you would have to
contribute $1400 [$550] per
month.
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses for each condition.
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Experiment 4 tested the moderating role of reminding people of the
exponential worsening of saving opportunities in the past versus
future in retirement saving inertia. We hypothesized that inertia is
induced by reminders of the exponential worsening of opportunities
from the past to the present, but not (or less so) by reminders of the
exponential worsening of opportunities from the present to the
future. If confirmed, this would support our reasoning that retirement
saving inertia results from a specific combination between the under-
estimation of exponential growth and reminders of missed opportuni-
ties. Before data collection, we preregistered the hypotheses,
materials, inclusion criteria, and key analyses (see osf.io/m9zdk).
5.1 | Method
Of the 713 participants who completed the survey, 628 participants
answered the attention check correctly (59.7% female, Mage = 35.92,
SDage = 10.80). Only these participants (i.e., 88.1%) were included in
the analyses. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
groups of a 2 (difference: 1 vs. 10 years) × 2 (opportunity: past oppor-
tunity vs. future opportunity) between‐subjects design.9 Participants
in all conditions read about a focal opportunity, where they could
enroll in the company retirement plan and contribute $500 per month.
In addition, participants in the past opportunity conditions read about
what they would have had to contribute if they had enrolled at an ear-
lier time, whereas participants in the future opportunity conditions
read about what they would have to contribute if they would wait
until a later time. Depending on the difference condition, the differ-
ence between the focal and nonfocal opportunities was 1 or
10 years.10 Table 1 provides an overview of conditions and manipula-
tions. Participants responded to an attention check and then indicated
how likely they would be to enroll in the retirement plan this month
(1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely). Participants who answered the atten-
tion check incorrectly were excluded from analyses.
5.2 | Results and discussion
The results of Experiment 4, the mean and standard deviation of like-
lihood to enroll per condition, are shown in Table 1. As predicted, the
ANOVA yielded a significant positive Difference × Opportunity inter-
action, F (1, 624) = 16.107, p < .001, ηp
2 = .03.11
When looking within the past opportunity conditions, participants
in the 10‐year condition were significantly less likely to enroll than do
participants in the 1‐year condition, t(331) = 5.86, p < .001, Cohen's
d = 0.64, 95% CI for Cohen's d [0.42, 0.86]. This replicates the inaction9We aimed to recruit 700 participants, based on a power analysis for a F ‐test (effect size
f = 0.15, power 1 − β = .90, required N = 469) and assuming that we would have to exclude
participants who failed to pass the preregistered exclusion criteria.
10Contributions were rounded estimates based on a scenario with 6.5% annual return
(reinvested) and age 45 at time of the focal opportunity.
11Including age as a covariate in an analysis of variance does not change the pattern of results.
Age has no significant effect on the likelihood of enrollment (p = .68). The interaction
between difference and opportunity remains significant (p < .001).inertia effect observed in Experiments 2 and 3. However, when
looking within the future opportunity conditions, the difference in
likelihood to enroll between the 10‐year condition and the 1‐year con-
dition is not significant and in the opposite direction, t(459) = −0.13,
p = .897, Cohen's d = 0.02, 95% CI for Cohen's d [−0.24, 0.21].
Experiment 4 confirms that reminding people of the exponential
worsening of saving opportunities by itself is not sufficient to cause
inertia. Providing information about the exponential changes in saving
opportunities from past to present can induce inaction inertia. Based
on this knowledge, Experiment 5 examined the effectiveness of an
intervention aimed at attenuating inaction inertia in retirement saving.6 | EXPERIMENT 5
Experiment 5 tested the moderating role of focus in retirement saving
inaction inertia. We hypothesized that shifting participants’ focus from
financial contributions to future financial outcome (“what you could
have ended up with at retirement age”) would attenuate the inaction
inertia effect. If confirmed, this would lay the groundwork for a possi-
ble intervention to reduce retirement saving inertia.
Before conducting Experiment 5, we ran three separate experi-
ments that each got at a part of the design reported in Experiment
5. A post hoc combination of the effects observed in these three
experiments suggested evidence for a moderation effect, which we
subsequently preregistered and formally tested in Experiment 5.
Because these studies were not a priori designed to test for this effect,
we did not include them in this article. Full details (methods and
results) on these experiments—labeled Experiment A, B, and C—are
provided in the Supporting Information (see osf.io/3n8x7). Experiment
5 was explicitly designed to test for the proposed moderation effect.
Before data collection, we preregistered the hypotheses, materials,
inclusion criteria, and key analyses (see osf.io/hdpkw).
TABLE 2 Experiment 5: Mean likelihood to enroll (on a scale from
1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely)
Focus condition
1 year 10 years p10‐year [1‐year] condition
Contribution focus 4.72 (1.66) 3.84 (1.76) <.001
“If you had enrolled 10
years ago [1 year ago],
you would have put in
$250 [$450] per month.
To accumulate the same
wealth, you would now
have to put in $500 each
month.”
Future outcome focus 5.59 (1.37) 5.64 (1.35) .66
“If you had enrolled 10
years ago [1 year ago],
you would have ended
up with $367,000 [$163,000]
at age 65. Because you did not
enroll, you will end up with
$148,000 at age 65 if you
enroll this month.”
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses for each condition.
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Of the 1,037 participants who completed the survey, 916 participants
answered the attention check correctly (53.9% female, Mage = 36.85,
SDage = 11.19). Only these participants (i.e., 88.3%) were included in
the analyses. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
groups of a 2 (difference: 1 vs. 10 years) × 2 (focus: contribution vs.
future outcome) between‐subjects design.12 The procedure in Experi-
ment 5 was again similar to that in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants
read about the missed opportunity to enroll in their company's retire-
ment plan and responded to an attention check. They then read about
the focal opportunity. As a dependent variable, participants indicated
how likely they would be to enroll in the retirement plan this year
(1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely). Different from the procedure in
Experiments 1 and 2, participants could proceed with the experiment
if they answered the attention check incorrectly. Those participants
were excluded from analyses.
Depending on the focus condition, the missed and focal opportuni-
ties were described in terms of required contribution or in terms of
expected outcome at retirement age.13 Depending on the difference
condition, the difference between the missed and focal opportunities
was 1 or 10 years. For instance, participants in the 10‐year future out-




annual retTen years ago, when you started working for Company A,
you were offered the possibility to enroll in the company's
retirement plan. In a letter about the plan, it said: “If you
start saving now, you will end up with $367,000 in
retirement savings at age 65.”On the next page, after answering the attention check, participants in
the 10‐year future outcome condition read:The past 10 years, you repeatedly considered enrolling
but you never got around to doing it. This week, you
receive another letter about the possibility to enroll in
the retirement plan. The letter says: “If you had
enrolled 10 years ago, you would have ended up with
$367,000 at age 65. Because you did not enroll, you
will end up with $148,000 at age 65 if you enroll this
month.”Table 2 provides an overview of conditions and manipulations.6.2 | Results and discussion
The results of Experiment 5, the mean and standard deviation of like-
lihood to enroll per condition, are shown in Table 2. The ANOVAlts of previous experiments (see the Supporting Information) suggested an interac-
size of partial η2 = .01. We therefore aimed to recruit 1,050 participants, based on
nalysis for an F test (effect size f = 0.1, power 1 − β = .90, required N = 1,043).
tion, present outcome, and future outcome were all based on a scenario with 8%
urn (reinvested) and age 45 at time of the focal opportunity.yielded a significant positive Difference × Focus interaction, F (1,
912) = 20.960, p < .001, ηp
2 = .02.14
When looking within the contribution conditions, participants in
the 10‐year condition were significantly less likely to enroll than were
participants in the 1‐year condition, t(453) = 5.46, p < .001, Cohen's
d = 0.51, 95% CI for Cohen's d [0.33, 0.70]. This replicates the inaction
inertia effect observed in Experiments 2, 3, and 4. However, when
looking within the future outcome conditions, no significant difference
in likelihood to enroll between the 10‐year condition and the 1‐year
condition is observed, t(459) = −0.44, p = .657, Cohen's d = 0.04,
95% CI for Cohen's d [−0.14, 0.22].
Experiment 5 thus reveals an important insight concerning the
boundary conditions of inaction inertia in retirement saving. The inac-
tion inertia effect, as induced by the passing of time between the
missed and focal opportunities, was completely absent when both
opportunities were described in terms of future outcomes instead of
required contributions. Focusing on future outcomes when communi-
cating retirement saving opportunities may be an effective remedy
against inaction inertia.7 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
Inertia in retirement saving is both common and consequential. Many
people do not adhere to the financial advice to start saving for retire-
ment early in life, as indicated by surprisingly low participation rates in
retirement plans that are financially attractive (Choi et al., 2011;14Including age as a covariate in an analysis of variance does not change the pattern of results.
Age has no significant effect on the likelihood of enrollment (p = .15). The interaction
between difference and focus remains significant (p < .001).
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2004). Financial institutions, governments, employers, and financial
advisors attempt to spur consumers to action by informing them about
the relative attractiveness and importance of early retirement saving
opportunities. In the current article, we demonstrated the possibility
of an unwanted side effect to this strategy. Focusing people's atten-
tion on the attractive opportunities that they have missed may cause
more instead of less saving inertia.
In the first two experiments, we examined whether and how infor-
mation about missed saving opportunities affected people's likelihood
to act on current saving opportunities. We found that, in the context
of retirement saving, inaction inertia can be induced in two ways. First,
inaction inertia can be induced by a change in expected return on
investment. People were less likely to act on a saving opportunity
when reminded of a missed opportunity with a much higher return,
than when reminded of a missed opportunity with a slightly higher
return. A second way in which inaction inertia can be induced in the
retirement context is by the worsening of saving opportunities over
time. People were less likely to act on a saving opportunity when
reminded of a missed opportunity from 10 years ago, than when
reminded of a missed opportunity from 1 year ago. In a third experi-
ment, we found evidence that inaction inertia in retirement saving is
associated with a tendency to underestimate the exponential rate with
which opportunities worsen over time. A fourth experiment showed
that providing information about the exponential changes in saving
opportunities from past to present can induce inertia, but that provid-
ing information about the exponential changes in saving opportunities
from present to future does not have this effect.
Taken together, these findings suggest that retirement saving is a
naturalistic setting where inaction inertia is likely to occur. This
improves our understanding of inertia in retirement saving decisions,
as well as our understanding of the role of time in inaction inertia by
extending results to situations of exponential rather than abrupt
decreases in attractiveness and to situations where passing time may
increase rather than attenuate the effects of inaction inertia.
Experiment 5 demonstrated that inaction inertia in retirement sav-
ing disappears when opportunities are described in terms of future
outcomes instead of required contributions. This finding is in line with
previous research showing that inaction inertia is diminished or absent
if people (1) focus on gains (Tykocinski et al., 1995), (2) focus on the
positive aspects of the opportunity (van Putten et al., 2013), (3) are
confronted with multiple options in the present (van Putten et al.,
2008), or (4) focus on possible improvement (van Putten et al.,
2009). We reason that when saving opportunities are described in
terms of future outcomes, people's attention is focused on the abso-
lute attractiveness of the current opportunity instead of on its unat-
tractiveness relative to the missed opportunity. This shift in focus
counteracts the inaction inertia effect.
The pattern of results also seems to indirectly support a sour
grapes explanation of inaction inertia, which has been proposed and
examined in previous work (van Putten et al., 2014; Zeelenberg
et al., 2006). According to this explanation, people respond to missing
out on an attractive opportunity by downplaying its attractiveness,which consequently reduces the attractiveness of subsequent, related
opportunities. This devaluation may be driven by a motivation to min-
imize the experience of regret. We have no direct evidence to support
this explanation because the current experiments were not designed
for this purpose. However, the results of Experiment 5 do suggest that
retirement saving inaction inertia is less likely to occur once it
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to downplay the attractiveness
of the missed and current saving opportunities. People who missed
an early saving opportunity may be fooling themselves into believing
that this opportunity was not so attractive after all. This form of
self‐deception, which leads to continued inertia, becomes unlikely
when it is made clear that the past and current opportunities are
undeniably attractive.
The experiments in this article asked participants to indicate their
likelihood of enrollment in a retirement plan given a hypothetical situ-
ation. Ideally, we would attempt to generalize our key findings to a
setting with actual, long‐term financial outcomes. Such an approach
would require us to randomly assign people to missing different retire-
ment saving opportunities, something that seems both implausible and
unethical. A more realistic option would be to conduct a smaller stakes
conceptual replication where people are randomly assigned to missing
different short‐term investment opportunities. However, such short‐
term investments would have the disadvantage of not providing the
appropriate context for a conceptual replication, given the finding in
this article that inaction inertia in retirement saving is in part driven
by people's underestimation of how rapidly opportunities worsen over
long periods of time. A third option would be to extend the current set
of experimental studies with correlational evidence supporting the
possibility of inaction inertia induced by the exponential worsening
of retirement saving opportunities over time. Unfortunately, such an
approach also appears to be problematic. Our prediction is not that
people become less likely to start saving for retirement as they
become older. Instead, our prediction is that people who are reminded
of attractive missed opportunities from early in life are less likely to act
on current opportunities compared with those who are either
reminded of more recent missed opportunities or not reminded of
missed opportunities at all.
The current findings do provide practical considerations for choice
and information architects who hope to motivate people to start sav-
ing for retirement, such as policymakers, financial advisors, and per-
sonnel managers. Educating consumers about the progressive nature
of retirement saving has been suggested as a promising way to moti-
vate saving. In fact, research has found that people increase their
retirement contribution after seeing in a graph how savings grow over
time (Goda, Manchester, & Sojourner, 2014; McKenzie & Liersch,
2011). The strategy of emphasizing the importance of early saving
for retirement seems sensible at first sight but may have some surpris-
ing and sometimes even detrimental effects on people's decisions.
Past research finds that perceptions of retirement saving importance
are not as directly predictive of people's retirement preparations as
policymakers seem to assume (Krijnen, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, &
van der Schors, 2019), and that emphasizing the importance of retire-
ment saving decisions can even cause people to postpone their
KRIJNEN ET AL. 61enrollment in a seemingly attractive retirement plan (Krijnen,
Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2015). Our current data adds another rea-
son to be careful: Some forms of financial education run the risk of
backfiring by reminding people of the attractiveness of missed oppor-
tunities, causing more rather than less inertia.
Inaction inertia may explain why providing peer information, as
another way to motivate employees' retirement saving, has been
found to backfire. Kumar (2004) demonstrated that social comparisons
can induce inaction inertia in purchase decisions. In a recent field
experiment, Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Milkman (2015)
found that providing employees with peer information led to lower
retirement plan enrollment. Information about other people (e.g.,
coworkers) who did choose to take advantage of earlier, better oppor-
tunities to save can serve as a painful reminder of what could have
been. As we have shown in this article, such reminders can increase
the likelihood of retirement saving inertia.
On a more optimistic note, the current findings, as well as the
broader literature, provide suggestions for how inaction inertia can
be countered. The risk of people falling prey to inaction inertia
seems smallest when saving opportunities are communicated in
terms of future outcomes or gains (see also Tykocinski et al., 1995;
van Putten et al., 2009; van Putten et al., 2014) or when they are
directly pitted against the possibility to miss attractive opportunities
in the present or future (Shani et al., 2015). Providing information
about savings growth is likely to work best (1) when tailored to
the situation of the individual recipient, (2) when focused on the
present and future rather than on the past, and (3) when described
in terms of expected outcomes instead of in terms of necessary con-
tributions. An organization should not attempt to inform employees
who are in the later stages of their career about the fact that
starting to save while young would have been ideal. Not only is this
information of little relevance to their individual case, it can even
induce continued inertia. Instead, it seems best to battle retirement
saving inertia by explaining what can still be done to accumulate suf-
ficient retirement wealth.ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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